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Outline: Article on INF Accord and 25th Anniversary (28 October)
of the "First (Tacit) INF Accord"

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In 1982, the doves in Time reveal details of deal; and their decision to keep it secret. (Why, after election of 1962, or

1964?) Consider effects of keeping that secret, and lying about it, for so long: the authority of JFK given to the proposition that refusing a public trade--or, any trade--of missiles on Turkey was worth a risk of nuclear war.

How could that be: that others (not, it turns out, Kennedy, but his advisors--particularly, it seems, McGeorge Bundy! plus hawks--the ones LBJ inherited, who got us into VN) did think this worthwhile. (Some thought the risks of war were low, some high; in fact, Nitze said he was lowest, and he put it at 10%. QUOTE)

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So, issues of

1) Secrecy, deception, Cold War ideology, "vital interests." Long-term lie about JFK, revealed in October 27 transcripts; not just the private deal revealed by RFK and in 1982, but JFK's acceptance of a public deal (and willingness to accept this by McNamara, Ball and others).

2) Relation of IRBMs, and other forward-based forces, to FU threats, Type II deterrence, protection of "vital interests" in far distant places where one does not have conventional superiority...for SU (in CMC) as for US.

3) Relation of vulnerable, forward-based forces to FU threats: deterrence of non-nuclear attack on local forces that include such vulnerable nuclear forces. See McNamara fears (Oct 27 transcript and elsewhere, retrospective quotes) of attacking IRBMs once they were operational; see Khrushchev memoirs and Burlatsky, on purpose of engendering just such fears, and thus protecting Cuba (and SAMS, and SU forces!) See contradictory US certainty that Turkish missiles would be attacked in retaliation (though a difference: SU attack would have been after considerable SU loss of life in Cuba; thus, it might have occurred despite SU fears.

Still, it would have been more inhibited than ExComm feared. Their fears reflected a belief that it had come to that, it would

have been because of Soviet intransigence in Cuba and/or Soviet attacks on US recon; thus, it would be one more product of Soviet toughness that produced the US attack in Cuba. But the US attack in Cuba might have been triggered, unwittingly, by Cuban action!

Likewise, in Europe, McN claims that nuclears have no credibility, no effectiveness as threats, no deterrent effect, no use at all. Yet he worries about forward-based forces! And rightly so. This implies a deterrent on Soviets similar to the deterrent effect of operational IRBMs on himself in 1962. (Or Chinese forces in 1969 and later, or after 1964. See hsr/de discussions in 1964. And Rusk reaction to proliferation, to India and elsewhere). ("Except for the Germans..." Use of Nevada for French in 1963?)

4) See implications of CMC for Intrilligator/Waltz thesis on the stabilising effects of proliferation: it shows some merit, so long as potential attackers are rational and prudent, and allow for possibility that defenders are not! (See characterization of deterrence in general, as requiring opponent to be rational, while we are not, and/or are perceived as not being rational). Yet actual ending of crisis illustrates the dangers in such weapons being possessed in the real world. Would everyone have really been safer if Castro had possessed control of the nuclears? Note

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Compare AJW attitudes on IRBMs in 1957, and in 1970s and 80s (see his note somewhere recently). And my analysis of stability then, 1961. (and work on Command and Control; compare Blair). Problem of PALs; Germany; (Delegation?)

5) IRBMs and decapitation; vulnerable strategic forces (or forward-based forces) and stability; stability and Type II/FU threats.

6) Type II deterrence and US foreign policy; in particular, the Secret Foreign Policy also supported by Covert Action. (And US actual development policies toward the Third World, as supported by World Bank, IMF, currency, tariff policies: multilateralism, "division of labor" (and proceeds), specialisation (imposed by First World): Third World as plantation, run by Simon Legrees (our support of oppressive police forces: Agee); a Secret Empire, secret because we are a democracy--though not really in foreign policy--with an anti-imperialist public and ideals.

Munn

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7) Soviet desires for, and desirable US acceptance of, parity of status, as basis for relationships. This is a major reason why right wing--all Republican candidates except Bush--are opposing the INF treaty (along with fact that it is a first step toward further disarmament, and legitimizes arms reductions). It promotes detente; and worse, detente on the basis of "equality". Right-wing says: "Why should we have to give up our necessary counterforce weapons, just to get them to give up weapons? They don't have a right to have any weapons anyway, as aggressors, an illegitimate regime, without legitimate interests to defend..." (As for arms race: "Who cares what weapons they have, so long as we have more?"

8) Once we accept equality of status with SU, we might even move in that direction with respect to smaller nations, even in Third World: e.g., the sovereignty of Nicaragua, Libya; the regional interests of Central American states, independent of ours, and their rights to initiatives in pursuit of these (Arias plan); the status of the World Court; UN peacekeeping forces (Gorbachev) rather than US unilateral action; non-intervention...

We might even question the ideological premise that the US has unique, special rights ("and obligations") and is bound by no law (even our own), one nation under the President, accountable to no one...

Post-opera

9) Relations of Superpowers to small "allies."

Hostage to the relation -- US takes great risks -- to ^{K/T} ~~the~~ ^{too}, too, to avoid losing relation, or "credibility" (!); yet will sacrifice their interests, too (Cuba, K; Turkey, US)

10) Instability or loss of control ^{and US policy at this;}
^{see MacMillan memo}

(Kissinger; Bush; delegation)

GEOP - WWE

11) Why the Right-wing hates the INF Accord

12) " (INF has worked out) relation or instability for NATO.

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9) Instability as loss of control. Fears about Turkish and Cuban IRBMs, by McNamara, Khrushchev. Kunsan; Iwakuni; delegation; relation of SIOP-62 to pre-WWI mobilization plans (concern for "interference," leading to a single plan).

10) Why the Right Wing Hates the INF Accord: arms race, detente, equality, arms control/"trusting Russians"; but also, the INF proposals smoked out a mainline (e.g., Stanley Hoffman, Harvard School) attachment to instability as the basis of NATO defense: not just to "rational FU," with its backup of "not incredible FS capability," but vulnerability of forward-based forces providing "linkage": just as Cuba counted (with some misgivings) on IRBMs as providing protection, and a basis for SU commitment to their defense ("Nikita, Nikita...": fury at removal); and Turkey likewise. See Castro to Szulc on motives for accepting missiles. (And note: this came out of a US covert operation, threatening invasion: without this, Cuba wouldn't have been so willing to be a nuclear target and to provoke US domestic pressures toward

\CII\thesis

Draft: The Crisis of the Crisis

How Castro Won the Cuban Missile Crisis for Kennedy

With Comments on the Epistemology of Crisis History

Since 1964, on the basis of a nine months' study of nuclear crises centering on the Cuban Missile Crisis, drawing both on access to highly classified materials and on my own participation in the CMC, I have had an understanding of its circumstances that answers satisfactorily, for me, several of the major puzzles that still mark discussion of the affair after twenty-five years.

One of these, to be addressed here, concerns its resolution. Why did Khrushchev "fold," and why exactly when he did? Why did he accept, hours after they were proposed, terms sure to be perceived as coming close to total surrender, without holding fast at least long enough to probe further in the direction of the much more favorable settlement he had demanded only twenty-four hours earlier?

CII\INF

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